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NOTE 
THE COLD DECISION OF 
COLDWELL BANKER: 
A CALIFORNIA COURT ENDS 
THE EVOLUTION OF BROKER 
LIABILITY WITH ONE DECISION 
INTRODUCTION 
A woman planning to purchase a home speaks to the 
seller's broker to help her decide whether to purchase the 
house. The seller's broker tells her that the home is in excel-
lent condition. Relying on the broker's representations, the 
woman buys the house. Some time later, the woman notices a 
moldy smell in the kitchen and downstairs bathroom. An envi-
ronmental test shows a dangerous level of mycotoxins and mold 
spores. The mold exposure causes the woman to become ex-
tremely sick, developing a case of asthma. The broker failed to 
adequately inspect the home for possible defects and failed to 
disclose known or reasonably ascertainable defects in the prop-
erty. Because a buyer relies on a broker's representations 
when purchasing a house, there is a duty of honesty and trust 
between the two. The broker's duty of care to the woman is 
readily apparent. Since the broker owes the woman a duty of 
care, if the other elements are proven, the broker is liable to 
the woman for misrepresentation, fraud, and negligence. 1 
1 See 6 B.E. Witkin, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS §§ 677, 732 at 60 (9th 
ed. 1990); see also Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1984) (discussing 
that the law requires a broker to disclose to a buyer material defects known to the 
259 
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But what happens when the individual who becomes sick 
and develops asthma is the purchaser's minor son? Does the 
broker's duty of care extend to the minor child living with the 
mother/purchaser? According to a recent California decision, 
Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, Inc. u. Supe-
rior Court, the broker owes no duty to a purchaser's child.2 
In Coldwell Banker, the buyer's son, Marcos, developed 
asthma and other illnesses from exposure to mold.3 The seller's 
broker failed to disclose the mold, which was either a known or 
a reasonably ascertainable defect.' Marcos sued the brokerage 
company, Coldwell Banker, for negligence, nuisance, inten-
tional infliction of emotional stress, fraud, and misrepresenta-
tion.6 The court found for Coldwell Banker on all counts, hold-
ing that since Marcos was not the actual buyer, the broker had 
no duty of care to him." The court opined that extending the 
duty to Marcos would create unlimited exposure to liability for 
a broker to anyone who could foreseeably be harmed in a 
buyer's house.7 
California has been at the forefront of modern changes in 
the law, including the expansion of the duty of disclosure.8 
However, this expansion stopped with Coldwell Banker. The 
holding in Coldwell Banker, that a broker's duty does not ex-
tend to the purchaser's minor child, may result in a domino 
effect of inequitable, cold-hearted decisions.9 The effect of these 
decisions will insulate brokers from future lawsuits, even when 
they are directly responsible for the injuries of others. In order 
to create more incentive for brokers to disclose all material 
facts, the court should have analyzed this case under a more 
relaxed standard. 
Coldwell Banker may also have a detrimental effect on 
persons injured by mold. Mold litigation is already complex, 
and the medical results are often ambiguous as to illnesses 
broker but unknown to and unobservable by the buyer, and if that broker fails to do so, 
they may be liable for misrepresentation, fraud, or negligence). 
2 Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, Inc. v. Superior Court, 11 
Cal. Rptr. 3d. 564 (2004). 
• [d. at 567. 
• [d. 
• [d. at 567-68. 
6 [d. at 570. 
7 [d. at 57l. 
8 See infra Part (I)(B) California and Disclosure. 
• [d. at 570. 
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mold may cause. IO This case adds another hurdle for injured 
individuals. Depending on the circumstances, they might not 
have anyone to bring a claim against, even when a broker is 
clearly at fault for failing to disclose a known defect in the 
home. Expanding a broker's duty of care to minor children of a 
purchaser would ensure that at least a minor foreseeably living 
in a home will have a cause of action against a negligent bro-
ker. 
Part I of this note focuses on the history of the broker's 
duty of disclosure and duties owed to third persons.l1 That part 
provides a historical framework of the evolving law in broker 
disclosure and the broker's duty to third persons, concentrating 
mainly on California law. Part II discusses the broker disclo-
sure statute and the downfall of its narrow interpretation. 12 
Part III discusses the common-law balancing test, and the 
benefits of its application to the Coldwell Banker case and 
other cases like it. 13 Finally, Part IV concludes that the court in 
Coldwell Banker erred by taking a narrow interpretation of the 
statute to establish the broker's duty to third persons, and that 
it should instead have used the common-law balancing test to 
establish duty.14 
I. BROKERS AND THIRD PERSONS 
A. COMMON-LAW DISCLOSURE AND THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT 
EMPTOR 
In a typical real estate transaction, a seller hires a broker 
who locates a prospective buyer to purchase the property. This 
transaction creates a fiduciary relationship between the seller 
and the seller's broker. 15 A fiduciary relationship begins when 
"a special confidence [is] reposed in one who in equity and good 
conscience is bound to act in good faith, and with due regard to 
10 See Thelma Jarman-Felstiner, Comment, Mold Is Gold: But, Will It Be The 
Next Asbestos?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 529, 541 (2003). 
11 See infra notes 15-86 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 97-153 and accompanying text. 
'4 See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
'" CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.16 (West 2005). 
3
Porrino: The Cold Decision of Coldwell Banker: A California Court Ends the
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
262 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
the interests of the one reposing the confidence. m6 The doctrine 
of caveat emptor, better known as "let the buyer beware" denied 
the existence of a fiduciary duty between the purchaser and the 
seller's broker in a real property transaction. '7 Therefore, when 
operating under the doctrine of caveat emptor, the seller and 
his or her agent has no affirmative duty to inspect or disclose 
defects in the property.18 
The principle of caveat emptor assumes that each party 
has equal access to the underlying facts forming the basis of 
the transaction!· Historically, a real property owner ex-
changed property with well-acquainted neighbors. 20 The sale of 
such property took place by simple face-to-face transactions; 
the parties were "familiar with the condition of property being 
exchanged, the competence of its builder, and the quality of its 
maintenance and renovation.rn, This is not the case in modern 
society. With the post-World War II population growth, a rap-
idly growing middle class began to move more and more.22 This 
created the need for the mass production of homes.23 With 
modern mass development and people moving all across the 
country, the buyer has less bargaining power then the builder-
vendor because the buyer does not have the same access to 
facts about the property.24 
The increase in vendor bargaining power increased the 
possibility of many unfair real estate transactions. 25 Sellers 
and their agents had the ability to sell defective property by 
simply not informing potential buyers about substantial defects 
on the property, and thereafter sellers and their agents would 
16 Vogel v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 801 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) 
(citations omitted). 
17 Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 112 (1884); Robert M. Zeit, Real 
Estate--Broker Liability To Purchasers--Herbert V. Saffell, 877 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1989), 
63 TEMP. L. REV. 165, 165 (1990). 
18 Id. 
19 Ronald Basso, Note, Reed v. King: Fraudulent Nondisclosure of a Multiple 
Murder in a Real Estate Transaction, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 877, 885-86 (1984). 
20 Alan M. Weinberger, Let The Buyer Be Well Informed?--Doubting The Demise 
Of Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387, 392 (1996). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 395. 
"J3 Id. 
24 Megan Peterson, Note, Seller Beware: Mandatory Disclosure Provisions in 
Iowa Put Sellers of Residential Real Estate on Alert, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 569,573 (2002) . 
.. Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Iowa 1985). 
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have no liability to buyers. 26 Homebuyers became bound by 
uninformed decisions regarding the condition of their newly 
purchased homes. 27 Consequently, courts began to recognize 
special relationships of trust between the parties, including the 
real estate broker. 28 Thus, to circumvent the harsh doctrine of 
caveat emptor, the courts recognized that this special relation-
ship imposed on the seller and broker an implied warranty of 
habitability.29 Accordingly, a buyer now has a means of re-
course when latent defects in a home interfere with the reason-
able expectation that the home is fit for habitation.30 
B. CALIFORNIA AND DISCLOSURE 
California has come a long way since the days of caveat 
emptor. Rather than conditioning disclosure on an implied 
warranty of habitability, California took a more aggressive ap-
proach by expanding the scope of the duty of a seller and bro-
ker to disclose material facts affecting the property to a pro-
spective buyer.31 The California case of Lingsch v. Savage ig-
nited California's movement toward this end.32 In Lingsch, a 
vendor and his broker failed to disclose to the purchasers that 
the building was in a state of disrepair, that units in the build-
ing were illegal, and that the building had been condemned by 
city officials. 33 The California court found that, '~here the 
seller [or broker] knows of facts materially affecting the value 
or desirability of the property and also knows that such facts 
are not known to, or within the reach of the diligent attention 
26 [d., see also Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure 
Legislation, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381, 387 (1995) (reviewing obligations imposed on a 
seller at common law). 
'l7 Kirk, 373 N.W.2d. at 493-94. 
28 ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAw § 293-4 at 346-52 (1987 & 
Supp. 1994) (discussing fiduciary duties the broker has toward buyers). 
29 See generally Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936, 177 
(Alaska 1990); Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427, 430 (Ariz. 1984); 
Coney v. Stewart, 562 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ark. 1978); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 
525 P.2d 88, 91 (Cal. 1974); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399, 408 (Colo. 1964); 
Vernali v. Centrella, 266 A.2d 200, 201-02 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970); Smith v. Berwin 
Builders Inc., 287 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972). 
30 Board of Directors of Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass'n v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 
712 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ill. 1999). 
31 Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963). 
32 [d. at 201-10. 
33 [d. at 203. 
5
Porrino: The Cold Decision of Coldwell Banker: A California Court Ends the
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
264 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
and observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to dis-
close them to the buyer."34 Thus, Lingsch opened the door to an 
extension of liability for fraud to a broker who intentionally 
failed to disclose a material defect of the property to the buyer. 
California continued to expand the broker's duty of disclo-
sure even further in the 1984 landmark case, Easton v. Strass-
burger."" In Easton, the court imposed an obligation upon bro-
kers to diligently inspect properties offered for sale."" As in 
Lingsch, a broker must disclose to prospective purchasers all 
material facts determined from an inspection that affects the 
value or desirability of the property.37 Easton differs from 
Lingsch, however, in that the plaintiff purchaser based his ac-
tion on simple negligence, not intentional misrepresentation."" 
The important distinction between the two theories of li-
ability, negligence and intentional misrepresentation, relates to 
the intent of the parties. Intentional misrepresentation re-
quires one to "willfully deceive another with intent to induce 
him to alter his position to his injury or risk. m9 In contrast, the 
general negligence theory does not require proof that the de-
fendant willfully caused harm or injury to the other:o "Negli-
gence is either the failure to do something that an ordinarily 
prudent person would do under given circumstances or the do-
ing of something that an ordinarily prudent person would not 
do under those circumstances."41 By making brokers liable for 
negligence involving nondisclosure, the Easton court exposed 
brokers to increased liability. 
In response to Easton, the California legislature added two 
articles to the Civil Code: California Civil Code sections 1102-
1102.15: Disclosures Upon Transfer of Residential Property, 
(hereinafter Transfer Article) and California Civil Code sec-
tions 2079-2079.10: Duty to Prospective Purchaser of Residen-
34 [d. at 204. 
35 Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984). 
36 [d. at 388. 
37 [d. 
38 [d. at 387. 
39 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1709 (West 2005) [emphasis added]; see also Maddux v. 
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (discussing the 
elements of fraud). 
40 Nancy Hersh & Ward Smith, Prima Facie Case of Negiigence, CAL. Crv. PRAC. 
TORTS § 1:1 (2004); see also B.E. Witkin, 6 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA L., TORTS § 729 
(9th ed.) (discussing the meaning of negligence). 
41 [d. 
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tial Property (hereinafter Broker Article)." Both articles apply 
to sales and value-related transfers of residential real property 
or residential stock cooperatives containing fewer than four 
dwelling units:a The Transfer Article requires the seller, or 
other transferor subject to the statute, as well as any broker 
involved in the transaction, to obtain and timely deliver a dis-
closure statement in the prescribed form." The Broker Article, 
on the other hand, applies only to sales and transfers involving 
a licensed real estate broker:· The Broker Article imposes upon 
brokers a duty "to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent 
visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to disclose 
to that prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the 
value or desirability of the property that such an inspection 
would reveal. »46 
Twenty two years after the groundbreaking case of Lingsch 
v. Savage, the enactment of the above statutes showed the evo-
lution of California's law and its imposition of the most strin-
gent duty of disclosure upon brokers. California took the first 
step to make sure brokers satisfy these duties by codifying the 
common-law doctrine that mandates broker disclosure to the 
buyer.47 A few years after the enactment of the California stat-
utes, sixteen other states passed their own legislation to re-
quire more disclosure in real estate transactions:a In contrast 
to California law, the laws of most of these states applied to the 
42 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15 and CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2079-2079.10. See 
legislative history at Section 4 of Stats. 1985, c. 223 ("It is the intent of the Legislature 
that this act codify and make precise the holding in Easton v. Strassburger (152 Cal. 
App. 3d 90)"). 
43 §§ 1102-1102.15; §§ 2079-2079.10 . 
.. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102.2, 1102.6, and 1102.12. 
'" CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079. For the full text of this statute, see infra note 79 . 
.. [d. 
" [d. 
48 For a detailed discussion, see Washburn at 381. These states include 
Maine(Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §§ 13001-13251 (West 1988 & Supp 1993)), Virginia 
(Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-517-55-525 (Michie Supp. 1994)), New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 477:4-c (Supp. 1993)), Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 709.01-709.08 (West 
Supp. 1994), Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 324.360 (Michie 1994))., Alaska (Alaska 
Stat. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (Supp. 1993)), Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2570-2578 
(1993)), Illinois (S.H.A. 765 ILCS 77/1-77/99 (Supp. 1994)), Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. §§ 
24-4.6-2 - 24-4.6-2-13 (West 1994)), Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. §§ 558A.1-558A.8 (1992 and 
Supp. 1994)), Maryland (MD. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 10-702 (Supp. 1993)), Michigan 
(Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.1286(51)-(66) (Callaghan Supp 19943), Mississippi (Miss. Code. 
Ann. §§ 89-1-501 - 89-1-523 (Supp. 1993)), Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5302.30 
(Anderson Supp. 1993)), Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws. §§ 5-20.8-1 - 5-20.8-10 (Supp. 
1993), and South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 43-4-37 - 43-4-44 (Supp. 1994). 
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seller and not the broker.'· Despite variation in these provi-
sions, the legislatures of these sixteen states enacted statutes 
that were narrow versions of the California Disclosure Act:o 
Although these states followed the trend of California's Trans-
fer Article, most of them refrained from enacting anything 
similar to California's Broker Article. 51 
California pioneered the expansion of a broker's duties of 
disclosure to the buyer by way of case law and statute. Cali-
fornia has recognized a special relationship of trust between 
the seller's broker and the future purchaser. 52 Based on this 
relationship, California imposed a duty to inspect and disclose 
any material defect to the property.53 Although California has 
taken a stance to protect the buyer, the state has failed to ex-
tend that protection to third persons in a real estate transac-
tion:' 
C. DUTY OWED TO THIRD PERSONS 
"As a general rule, any person who performs professional 
services owes a duty of care to all third persons within the area 
•• For example, in Virginia, the legislature mandated 'disclosure for all sales and 
related transfers for value of residential real property of four or fewer units whether or 
not a real estate broker is involved. Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-517-55-525 (Michie Supp. 
1994). The difference is that the disclosure falls solely on the owner. [d. § 55-519(1). 
Moreover, the Virginia statute specifically stated, "The disclosure form shall also con-
tain a notice to purchasers that the information contained in the disclosure is the rep-
resentations of the owner and is not the representations of the broker or salesperson, if 
any." [d. § 55-519(2) In Alaska, the legislature came up with a similar Act to that of 
California, mandating that the seller, instead of the broker, complete and deliver to 
any prospective purchaser a disclosure statement in a form to be established by the 
state's real estate commission. Alaska Stat. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (1993). The remedy 
provided by this statute offers actual damages to the purchaser for negligent violation 
of the statute. [d. § 34.70.090(b). If the violation is willful, the purchaser may recover 
up to three times the actual damages. [d. § 34.70.090(c). Both of these statutes remain 
unchanged as of 2005. 
50 Washburn at 431. 
51 See supra notes 50 and 51. Although most of these are narrow versions of the 
CAL. CIV. CODE section 2079, Maine has enacted a statute that is very similar to Cali-
fornia's. There, the broker must disclose material defects on the property that they 
know of, or reasonably should know of. 32 M.R.S.A. § 13273(2)(a) (West 2005). 
52 GAUDIO, supra note 30, at 356-62. 
53 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079 (West 2005). 
54 See Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564 (2004). 
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of foreseeable risk.""" In a real estate transaction, the seller's 
agent owes a duty of care to the buyer to act reasonably to pre-
vent a risk of injury to the buyer. 56 The agent's duty owed to 
third persons, however, depends on which liability theory is 
used; a broker may be subject to liability on the basis of either 
negligence or negligent misrepresentation. 57 To determine the 
extent of the broker's duty of care, California courts use a two-
pronged analysis.58 First, courts examine "whether a reason-
able person would have foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm 
to the third person.""· Secondly, in view of such risk, the courts 
analyze whether "the broker exercised ordinary care under the 
circumstances. "60 
Norman 1. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker 
demonstrates one criterion for establishing a duty of care:' In 
Norman 1. Krug, the court found a broker negligent for failing 
to disclose the existence of an unrecorded interest to a prospec-
tive buyer or to inform the interest holder of impending sale, 
even though the interest holder had been informed of a previ-
ous potential sale.62 The court examined the broker's duty of 
care to a third person by weighing a number of factors:3 These 
factors included (1) the foreseeability of harm, (2) the degree of 
certainty that the third party was injured, (3) "the closeness of 
the connection between the broker's conduct and the injury suf-
fered," (4) "the moral blame attached to the broker's conduct," 
50 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL 
ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004); see also Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. 
Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1990) (citing text). 
06 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL 
ESTATE §§ 3:43, 3:45 (3d ed. 2004). 
57 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL 
ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004). 
06 Norman 1. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228, 
231 (1990); see Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA 
REAL ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004); B. E. WITKIN, 6 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 
TORTS §§ 750-760 (9th ed. 1990). 
5. Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228, 
(1990). 
62 Id. at 229-30 and 232. 
63 Id. at 231. 
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(5) the prevention of future harm, and (6) the extent to which 
the transaction is intended to affect the third party.6. 
This method of analysis has been utilized in many differ-
ent contexts."s Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, a 
premises liability case, represents one example of how the bal-
ancing test has been utilized in a wide variety of liability 
claims.66 Premises liability cases use a similar balancing 
method to establish duty.67 In Ann M., the court used a balanc-
ing test to establish whether a business proprietor has a duty 
to protect customers from the criminal acts of others.68 This 
balancing test weighs the burden of imposing a duty to protect 
against the criminal acts of third persons against the foresee-
ability of harm.69 Many courts have chosen to follow the same 
rule and rationale set forth in Ann M. to establish duty!O 
In the context of analyzing a broker's duty to third per-
sons, however, the California courts have neglected to use a 
balancing test similar to those applied in Ann M. and Norman 
1. Krug.71 For example, the court in Easton found that a real 
estate broker who represented the vendor had an affirmative 
duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection 
of the residential property listed for sale.72 From that search, 
the broker then needed to disclose to prospective purchasers all 
facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the prop-
erty that such an investigation would revea1. 73 In this ruling, 
the court limited its decision to prospective purchasers and did 
.. Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228, 
231 (1990); see also Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA 
REAL ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004). 
65 Contexts in which the balancing test has been applied include third-party 
liability claims dealing with lessees and contractors, J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 
60 (1979), beneficiaries of a will and lawyers, Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), and 
manufacturers and carriers, North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 466 (1997). 
66 Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (1993). 
67 [d. at 215. 
68 [d. 
59 [d. 
70 See Pamela W. v. Millsom, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 695-96 (1994); Sharon P. v. 
Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 126 (1999). 
71 Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); Coldwell Banker Residen-
tial Brokerage Company, Inc. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 564 (2004). 
72 Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. 
73 [d., (emphasis added). 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss2/6
2005] COLD DECISION OF COLDWELL BANKER 269 
not include third party liability in its analysis. 74 A year later, 
that rule was codified in California Civil Code section 2079.75 
In 2004, the court applied section 2079 in Coldwell 
Banker. 76 In that case, after a minor's mother purchased a 
house, the child developed asthma caused by toxic mold in the 
house. 77 The minor brought many causes of action against the 
real estate broker.78 The court concluded that the statutory 
inspection and disclosure duties of residential real estate bro-
kers did not impose on the broker a duty of care toward the 
minor child. 79 The court reasoned that from "the clear and un-
ambiguous language of section 2079, the inspection and disclo-
sure duties of residential real estate brokers and their agents 
apply exclusively to prospective buyers, and not to other per-
sons who are not parties to the real estate transaction."80 Al-
though the mold caused harm to a minor child who was an oc-
cupant of the purchased home, and this harm was a likely re-
sult of the broker's lack of disclosure, that child has no cause of 
action against the broker.81 
The court in Coldwell Banker refused to impose liability on 
brokers for failure to disclose material defects to third per-
sons.82 The court rejected the traditional rule that a broker 
owes a duty to all foreseeable third persons, believing that 
"foreseeability is not a substitute for legal duty."B3 Moreover, 
the court has ignored the many other possible bases to estab-
lish duty on a broker, in particular, the balancing test utilized 
7. [d. 
75 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079 (West 2005). Section (a) of the California Civil Code 
section 2079 provides: "(a) It is the duty of a real estate broker or salesperson, licensed 
under Division 4 (commencing with Section 10000) of the Business and Professions 
Code, to a prospective purchaser of residential real property comprising one to four 
dwelling units, or a manufactured home as defined in Section 18007 of the Health and 
Safety Code, to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the 
property offered for sale and to disclose to that prospective purchaser all facts materi-
ally affecting the value or desirability of the property that an investigation would re-
veal, if that broker has a written contract with the seller to find or obtain a buyer or is 
a broker who acts in cooperation with that broker to find and obtain a buyer." 
76 Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d. 564,569-70 (2004). 
77 [d. at 567. 
78 [d. 
78 [d. at 570. 
'" [d. at 569 
81 [d. at 564-73. 
82 [d. 
83 [d. at 571. 
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in Norman I. Krug or Ann M.8' By utilizing a strict statutory 
framework to establish a broker's duty, the court narrowed a 
broker's liability only to prospective purchasers.85 Conse-
quently, Coldwell Banker found that this duty extends merely 
to the actual buyer, and not the buyer's minor child living in 
the purchased home.86 
II. THE ROLE OF THE STATUTE AND DEFINING THE DUTY OF 
CARE 
The Coldwell Banker court should have used a common-
law balancing test to establish the broker's duty to third per-
sons, thereby possibly extending the broker's duty to a pur-
chaser's minor child. Instead, the court followed a narrow 
reading of the statute and thereby rejected the idea of extend-
ing the broker's duty of inspection and disclosure to the pur-
chaser's minor child. 87 The court concluded that the broker 
owed a duty only to the actual purchaser. 88 Although this is in 
accord with the statutory language, the court ignored the rea-
son for the steady increase in the need for disclosure. 89 The 
reason for the increase in broker disclosure can be drawn from 
an analysis of the legislative intent of California Civil Code 
section 2079. The purpose of the statute was to codify the hold-
ing in the Easton case.90 Further, the provisions of the act are 
to be interpreted as "a defmition of the duty of care found to 
exist by Easton v. Strassburger, and the manner of its dis-
charge.»91 It can be logically inferred that the reasoning behind 
the Easton court's decision is part of the reason that the Legis-
lature codified the holding in the first place. The Easton court 
84 Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228, 
231 (1990); Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (1993). 
85 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 569-70. See CAL. CN. CODE § 2079 
(West 2005). 
86 Id. at 570. 
87 Id. at 564-73. 
88 Id. 
89 § 2079. The statute reads: a broker must "conduct a reasonably competent and 
diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to disclose to that prospec-
tive purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property 
that an investigation would reveal." (emphasis added). 
90 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2709 (West 2005); Section 4 of Stats. 1985, c. 223 ("It is the 
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came to its decision in order to protect buyers from unscrupu-
lous brokers deceiving them into believing they are obtaining 
habitable properties when in fact they are tainted with de-
fects. 9o Because brokers similar to the one in Coldwell Banker 
are shielded from liability, allowing minor children of the pur-
chaser to remain remediless does not achieve the legislative 
intent. 
As said in Easton, "[t]he primary purposes of the [Lingsch] 
rule are to protect the buyer from the unethical broker and 
seller and to insure that the buyer is provided sufficient accu-
rate information to make an informed decision whether to pur-
chase. "93 Although the court's reasoning is to make sure the 
buyer is well informed in making the purchase, it is reasonably 
apparent that the court also intended to protect buyers from 
unethical brokers. Protecting the buyer from an unethical bro-
ker not only includes protection from financial hazards, but 
from health hazards as well. It is a hard-hearted thought to 
believe the courts are only concerned with a buyer's economic 
injuries and not with their health injuries. A minor child living 
in the purchaser's home is exposed to all the same dangers as 
the purchaser in that home. Therefore, it is reasonable to pro-
tect that child from the same health injuries that may occur 
from defects in that home. 
Furthermore, the Legislature included section 2079.24 of 
the California Civil Code, which proclaims "nothing in- this ar-
ticle shall be construed . . . to relieve agents . . . from liability 
for their conduct in connection with acts governed by this arti-
cle or for any breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of disclo-
sure. "94 Here, the statute is keeping with the evolution of bro-
ker liability by adding protection to purchasers from unscrupu-
lous brokers without relieving brokers from any other liability. 
In other words, the Legislature is making sure that the effect of 
the article is to expand the broker's duty to purchaser, not to 
shield them from the kind of liability that brokers have been 
exposed to in the past. Since brokers have been liable for fail-
92 Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
93 Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388; Original wording in the brackets was "Cooper· 
Lingsch." Cooper refers to a case in 1974 that followed the ruling in Lingsch to find a 
sales agent had a duty to the purchaser. Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 
(1976). 
94 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2709.24 (West 2005) 
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ure to disclose to third persons before this statute, liability to 
third persons should survive this statute."5 Thus, the common-
law balancing test should have been used to establish the bro-
ker's duty to Marcos. 
Unfortunately, instead ofutili";;.ng the common-law balanc-
ing test to establish duty, the court in Coldwell Banker saw the 
narrow wording of the statute as the only basis for finding 
duty."· This result rejected the notion of extending the disclo-
sure and inspection duties to any third person. Thereby, the 
court closed off any opportunity in the future for any minor 
child of a home purchaser to make a reasonable claim against a 
broker. For example, a minor child foreseeably living in a 
house would have a reasonable claim against a broker under a 
balancing test, but if the court follows the narrow reading of 
the statute, the child is left without a cause of action. By fol-
lowing the statute, the court leaves injured children with no 
recourse in the law against the broker who is responsible for 
the injury. By using the common-law balancing test to estab-
lish duty for third persons, the court might have come to a 
more equitable result. 
III. THE BALANCING TEST AND ESTABLISHING A BROKER'S 
DUTY 
According to Coldwell Banker, a broker's duty of care only 
extends to a purchaser."7 The Coldwell Banker Court based its 
decision on a strict reading of California Civil Code section 
2079 and case law."· The court, however, did not have to re-
strict itself to the narrow wording of the statute. The court 
may have opted to take a broader approach. It could have in-
cluded the purchaser's minor children in the broker's duty of 
care analysis. It is a logical extension of the duty, especially 
since a minor child is dependant on the parent for shelter, and 
.. Norman L Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 CaL Rptr. 228, 
231 (1990); see Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA 
REAL ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004); B. E. WITKIN, 6 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 
TORTS §§ 750-760 (9th ed. 1990). Discussed supra at notes 56-65 . 
.. Coldwell Banker, 11 CaL Rptr. 3d. at 564-73. 
97 Id . 
.. One of these cases is FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 CaL Rptr. 2d 
404 (1995). In that case, the liability did not extend to social guests because they were 
not intended beneficiaries. This case and the other cases used in Coldwell Banker are 
discussed infra in notes 135-153 and accompanying text. 
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therefore suffers the same consequences if a home is inhabit-
able. Instead, the court established a bright-line rule of whom 
the broker is liable. But the legislative intent was not to 
minimize the broker's liability to the buyer only. It was to cod-
ify the holding in Easton, which established negligence as a 
viable cause of action against a broker, thereby expanding the 
duty of disclosure to buyers.99 The Easton decision continued 
the evolution of broker liability. The court in Coldwell Banker 
ended that evolution abruptly with its decision to shield bro-
kers from third party liability. 
The court missed its chance to continue in the progression 
of broker liability and the opportunity to protect buyers and 
their children from unscrupulous brokers. Instead, they con-
centrated more on the policy to protect brokers from overexpo-
sure to lawsuits. loo Due to the extreme circumstances of the 
case, the court should have gone through a balancing analysis 
to see if a buyer's child, who lives in the home, deserves a duty 
of care from the broker. 
The Coldwell Banker court took a narrow view of the stat-
ute to identify the persons to whom the duty is owed. lol How-
ever, there are many factors that establish a duty that the 
court failed to consider. Whether a broker owes a duty of care 
to third persons in any specific situation is a question of law 
determined by weighing many factors. 102 These factors include 
(1) the foreseeability of harm, (2) the degree of certainty that 
the third party was injured, (3) "the closeness of the connection 
between the broker's conduct and the injury suffered," (4) "the 
moral blame attached to the broker's conduct," (5) the preven-
tion of future harm, and (6) the extent to which the transaction 
is intended to affect the third party. 103 With an analysis of 
these criteria, the court would have found that the broker had 
a duty to the child. 
99 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2709 (West 2005); Section 4 of Stats. 1985, c. 223 ("It is the 
intent of the Legislature that this act codify and make precise the holding in Easton v. 
Strassburger."); Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1984). 
100 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 571. 
101 [d. at 569-70. 
102 Krug, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31, discussed supra at notes 62-65. 
103 [d. 
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A. THE FORESEEABILITY OF HARM 
As the court mentioned in Norman 1. Krug, "[t]he most im-
portant step in determining if a broker owes a duty of care to a 
third party is to examine 'whether a reasonable person would 
have foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm to the third person 
and whether in view of such risk the broker exercised ordinary 
care under the circumstances.'"'o, In Coldwell Banker, the court 
rejected the foreseeability argument.I05 It did not find that 
harm to Marcos was not foreseeable. I06 The court instead de-
valued the foreseeability argument in this context and made it 
inapplicable. 107 
The court mentioned that "foreseeability is not a substitute 
for legal duty. Rather, foreseeability of harm is merely one fac-
tor to be considered in imposing negligence liability."108 There-
fore, the court seemed to suggest that foreseeability, by itself, is 
not enough to impose a duty.109 Here, the court only looked at 
two of the six factors: the foreseeability of the harm and the 
extent that the transaction was intended to affect the third 
party. 110 Although the Court mentioned that foreseeability 
alone cannot establish duty, it failed to analyze the other fac-
tors that are used to establish duty.1II By weighing the rest of 
the factors, the court might have come to a more equitable re-
sult. 
After discussing only these two elements, the court dis-
posed of the foreseeability argument on public policy grounds. 112 
The court feared that expanding the duty to nonparties to the 
transaction would expose the broker to infinite liability.1I3 In a 
footnote, the court stated it was afraid that a decision expand-
ing the duty to non parties to the transaction would place pro-
fessional liability on a slippery slope. 114 "Although the court 
10< Krug, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 231, (quoting Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 
MILLER & STARR, CAL. REAL ESTATE § 3.27 at 158 (2d ed. 1989). 





110 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 570-l. 
III Id. at 564-73. 
112 Id. at 57l. 
113 Id. at 571 n.5. 
114Id. 
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makes credible policy arguments in favor of limiting the bro-
ker's exposure to claims, the court draws the line in the wrong 
place.'m5 The court did not have to restrict liability solely to the 
parties involved in the transaction. "'Foreseeability' and 'policy 
considerations' are not determined in a vacuum, but rather de-
pend upon the particular circumstances in which the purported 
wrongful conduct occurred."116 Instead, the court could ''have 
drawn a limited duty on these facts, to protect the minor chil-
dren of buyers who suffer foreseeable harm when a broker fails 
to disclose or inspect for defective conditions in a home.'''17 Ex-
tending a broker's duty to minor children would not put profes-
sional liability on a slippery slope.1I6 It would concentrate the 
liability on buyers and their minor children, and not nannies, 
neighbors, or any other foreseeable third party.1I0 
Furthermore, imposing "a duty to minor children would 
not by itself lead to liability in all cases.",20 The plaintiff would 
still need to go through the process of proving the other ele-
ments of negligence, like establishing the causal link between 
the broker's failure to disclose and the harm the child suf-
fered. l21 This approach would at least let the claim get to a jury. 
Taking this approach would not only limit the scope of liability, 
it would encourage brokers to be more diligent in their inspec-
tion and their disclosure. 122 There is no harm in creating more 
incentive for the broker to do exactly what his or her job is in 
the first place. Instead, the Coldwell Banker court protected 
the broker, while leaving the foreseeably injured child without 
a cause of action. 123 
The Coldwell Banker court circumvented the well-
established foreseeability test by declaring that it had to follow 
the "clear and unambiguous language of section 2079.'''24 By 
doing this, the court extinguished the foreseeability rule, which 
is the most important step to determine if the broker owes a 
no Markita Cooper, Brokers and Salespersons, 27 CEB REAL PROP L REP 107 
(2004). 
116 Burger v. Pond, 273 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1990). 







124 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 569. 
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duty of liability to a third person. 125 With this ruling, no third 
person can ever make a claim against a broker. The result is 
that brokers, who previously were responsible for third per-
sons' injuries caused by their misrepresentations, will not be 
held accountable for their actions. The Coldwell Banker court 
erred in destroying one of the most important factors in deter-
mining duty. The court also failed to analyze the other impor-
tant factors of the balancing test. Application of the balancing 
test would have brought the court to a more justifiable out-
come. The following sections outline that possible result. 
B. THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY THAT THE THIRD PARTY 
SUFFERED INJURY 
The degree of certainty that Marcos suffered injury can be 
easily measured An environmental test of the house showed a 
dangerous level of mold spores and mycotoxins. 126 The mold 
exposure not only caused Marcos's illness, but also the devel-
opment of his asthma.127 Although becoming ill is temporary, it 
is still an injury. Further, asthma may be a lifelong affliction. 
Therefore, there is an extremely high degree of certainty that 
Marcos suffered injury. 
C. THE CLOSENESS OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 
BROKER'S CONDUCT AND THE INJURY SUFFERED 
While the mold itself literally caused Marcos to become ill 
and develop asthma, the broker arguably was the proximate 
cause of the harm Marcos suffered. Had the broker disclosed to 
the family the presence of dangerous mold inside the house, the 
family most likely would not have purchased and thereafter 
lived in the home, and Marcos would not have been injured. 
Alternatively, if the mother was aware of the mold, she may 
have cured the defect. Thus, if the broker disclosed the mold, 
Marcos would not have suffered any injuries. The broker's 
failure to disclose the harmful mold in the home has a direct 
125 /(rug, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 231, (quoting 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL 
ESTATE § 3.27 at 158 (2d ed. 1989). 
126 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 567. 
127 [d. 
18
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connection to the injury suffered. Had the court applied the 
balancing test, this would all have been provable at trial. 
D. THE MORAL BLAME A'ITACHED TO THE BROKER'S CONDUCT 
Moral blame attaches to someone when that person's fail-
ure to conform to standards of what is right and just causes 
someone harm.'28 A high degree of moral blame attaches to the 
broker, since the broker was helping in the sale of a dangerous 
home. But inducing someone to buy a home that has defects 
and hiding them from the purchaser constitutes an even 
greater amount of moral blame. By deceiving the buyer and 
her minor son that the home was without defects, the broker 
caused Marcos to contract asthma, an affliction that may be 
with him for the rest of his life. 129 Morally, it was not right to 
induce someone to buy a house that would be dangerous for her 
family to live in. 
E. THE POLICY OF PREVENTING FUTURE HARM 
Imposing a duty of care on the broker to the buyer's minor 
children provides an excellent way to prevent future harm. 
Since the broker's only concern regards injuries to the actual 
buyer, the incentive to disclose latent defects is extremely low. 
The incentive to disclose would be higher if the court used a 
balancing test that includes children in the broker's duty. 
Therefore, the broker would be likely to be more careful with 
disclosure because the probability of being liable for someone's 
injury is higher. In the context of defects that endanger health, 
the probability is further increased by involving children be-
cause they have immature immune systems, rendering them 
128 See PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, 21·23 (5'h ed. 1984). 
129 It is extremely interesting that at no point in its opinion does the court men-
tion the actual age of Marcos. When analyzing this case in the CEB Real Property Law 
Reporter, my mentor Markita Cooper wrote, "I must also mention that at no point in 
the opinion does the court tell us how old Marcos is, deeming only to describe him as 
his mother's 'minor child.' 1 would imagine that if we knew Marcos' age, we would find 
this decision all the more disturbing. By depersonalizing Marcos and focusing on outly-
ing cases of potential exposure, the court uses the concept of 'no duty' to deflect atten-
tion from an unjust result." Markita Cooper, Brokers and Salespersons, 27 CEB REAL 
PRoP L REP 107 (2004). If Marcos happened to be extremely young, the amount of 
moral blame seemingly would be even greater. 
19
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more vulnerable to infection. 130 If the broker owes a duty to the 
children in the house, the broker is more likely to adequately 
disclose defects. The more incentive a broker has to disclose 
defects, the more likely dangerous homes will not be sold. This 
will result in fewer injuries to innocent people living in these 
defective homes. Essentially, the harm will be prevented by 
sheer fear of being sued. 
Furthermore, creating more incentives to provide proper 
disclosure is a small price to pay to protect children like Mar-
cos, if it is a price at all. The Coldwell Banker court opined 
that expanding broker liability to all foreseeable third persons, 
like Marcos, would be far out of proportion to the broker's 
fault. 131 In the present case, the broker clearly failed to disclose 
mold in the home.132 Because of the mold, the buyer and her 
minor son were injured. 133 Thus, expanding broker liability to 
third persons in this case seems to be directly in proportion to 
the broker's fault. More importantly, the main focus of this 
case should be the prevention of future harm and providing an 
incentive to brokers to help prevent that harm. If this case ex-
tended a broker's duty to minor children living in the home, it 
would only create more incentive for brokers to disclose.13' 
Making a broker actually do his or her job, and prevent future 
harm at the same time, does not lead to a harsh result. 
F. THE EXTENT THAT THE TRANSACTION WAS INTENDED TO 
AFFECT THE THIRD PARTY 
The extent that the transaction was intended to affect the 
third party was an argument analyzed by the Coldwell Banker 
court and one that weighed heavily in the case. 135 The court 
analyzed this element with respect to the broker-client rela-
tionship and who the intended beneficiary was. 13G The court 
"'" Joel Schwartz, PhD, Air Pollution and Children's Health, 113 PEDIATRICS 
1037, 1037-1043 (2004), available at 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/contenUabstracUll314/S1I1037 (last visited 
Mar. 25,2005). 
131 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 57l. 
132 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 567. 
133 Id. 
134 Cooper, supra note 116 at 108. 
130 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 570-71. (Note the above four standards 
were not mentioned at all in the case). 
136 Id. 
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mentioned that "[a]s suppliers of information in a commercial 
context, the brokers' duty only extended to intended beneficiar-
ies of the brokers' advice."I37 The court reasoned that Marcos 
was not an intended beneficiary of factual disclosures regard-
ing the value and desirability of the house purchased by his 
mother, and therefore no duty extended to him.'38 
The circumstances in this case differ from every other case 
the court used to interpret the law regarding broker disclosure 
and intended beneficiaries. 139 The court should not have ana-
lyzed this case in a vacuum. The court seemed to disregard the 
fact that Marcos was the buyer's minor son, and instead 
treated him as they would any third person. Instead, the court 
should have analyzed the case under its own specific circum-
stances. Three cases were cited in the court's analysis of the 
lack of broker-third party relationship in Coldwell Banker. 140 
The first case used as persuasive authority by the Coldwell 
Banker court was FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court.14I 
There, the court found that a broker was not liable to partygo-
ers injured by a defective deck on the property.142 In Coldwell 
Banker, the court was dealing with the injury of a minor child 
living in the purchaser's home, not with social guests. 
In FSR, the benefit intended from the transaction was not 
extended to social guests because they were outside the trans-
action. 143 This factor weighs very heavily in this context be-
cause guests are so far attenuated from the transaction, that it 
would be unconscionable to extend a duty them. In contrast, 
Coldwell Banker involved a minor child living in the home with 
the mother/purchaser who was the prime beneficiary of the 
transaction. 144 The diversity of the factual scenarios means 
they can hardly be compared. The child is living in the home, 
whereas social guests are only in the home temporarily to have 
a good time. Furthermore, the child is under the care of the 
137 [d. at 570, (citing FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404 
(1995». 
138 [d. 
139 See FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404 (1995), Bur-
ger v. Pond, 273 Cal.Rptr. 709 (1990), Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 
(1992) . 
.. 0 [d. 
IU Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 570. 
142 FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404, 406 (1995). 
143 [d. at 406-07. 
144 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567. 
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mother and dependent on her for health and well-being. Since 
the child is so directly involved with the mother, it is reason-
able for the minor child to be treated as a beneficiary of the 
transaction as well. In contrast, social guests are most likely 
adults who can care for themselves. They have no real connec-
tion to the purchaser at all. Minor children and social guests 
are so distinguishable, the court should not have compared the 
two. 
A second case that was cited in the Coldwell Banker court's 
analysis was Burger v. Pond,,4s In Burger, the court held that a 
lawyer's duty did not extend to a new wife in a divorce proceed-
ing with an ex-wife.14• There, plaintiff and her husband filed an 
action against the husband's lawyer based upon his alleged 
negligent handling of the husband's divorce from his first 
wife. l47 As in FSR, the third party's relationship to the profes-
sional was too far attenuated for the court to extend a duty to-
ward the third party. The facts of Burger are easily distin-
guishable from those of Coldwell Banker. In Burger, the new 
wife had no involvement in the divorce proceeding with her 
husband's ex-wife. 148 Although the proceeding may have af-
fected her, it did so only indirectly. In contrast, Marcos was 
directly affected by the transaction between his mother and the 
broker. Marcos's asthma and other injuries were most likely 
sustained as a direct result of the broker's failure to disclose 
the dangers of mold in the home and the broker's representa-
tions that the home was in excellent condition. 149 The facts of 
Burger and Coldwell Banker are so different, the court should 
not have used Burger in its analysis. 
A third case to be used in Coldwell Banker was Bily v. Ar-
thur Young & CO.ISO That case involved investors who sought to 
base a claim on an accountant's individual audit of a company 
in which they were investing. 161 Even though the plaintiffs in 
Bily had allegedly made investments in reliance on the audit 
reports, the Court held that an auditor can be held liable in 
general negligence only to the person or entity contracting for 
I .. Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 570. 
I .. Burger v. Pond, 273 Cal.Rptr. 709, 717 (1990). 
147 Burger, 273 Cal.Rptr. 709 at 712-13. 
148 Burger, 273 Cal.Rptr. 709 at 714, 717. 
149 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567. 
150 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 570. 
un Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745,747-9 (1992). 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss2/6
2005] COLD DECISION OF COLDWELL BANKER 281 
the auditing services.152 The plaintiffs in Bily sought recovery 
for damages allegedly resulting from economic loss. 163 In con-
trast, Marcos suffered physical injury as opposed to mere eco-
nomic loss. Further, the auditor in Bily had no duty to the in-
vestors because they were not an integral part of the transac-
tion. On the other hand, Marcos was directly involved in the 
outcome of the transaction because he lived in the house being 
purchased. The policy of protecting investors from economic 
loss differs greatly from the policy of protecting minor children 
from physical harm. Comparing the two puts the priorities on 
an equal plane, which leads to cold results like those espoused 
in Coldwell Banker. The health of children should be more im-
portant then the financial woes of an investor and therefore 
should not be analyzed under the same standard. 
Marcos may not have been the intended beneficiary of the 
transaction, but he did benefit from the transaction. Marcos 
benefited from the broker convincing his mother that the prop-
erty was desirable, of course, only if the property were desir-
able. His benefit from the transaction was his mother's knowl-
edge of the habitability of the home. If his mother knew of the 
defect, she might not have purchased the home, and Marcos 
probably would not have asthma now. Without knowledge of 
the true condition of the property, Marcos unwittingly fell vic-
tim to living in a dangerous home. 
The court seemed so concerned about a broker's exposure 
to liability, that it ignored the policy behind protecting human 
health. It is understandable that the court did not want a bro-
ker to be liable to any foreseeable nonparty, because that might 
include everyone connected to the buyer. However, minor chil-
dren of the purchaser living in the home are vulnerable and 
cannot fend for themselves in the real world. They rely on 
their parents for food, clothes, shelter, and protection. They 
are as much part of the parent as anything else in the world. 
This is especially true in the case of minor children. Therefore, 
they should be owed the same duty of care by the broker that 
extends to the purchaser. This would not open up the flood-
gates of liability infinitely. Instead, this expansion is necessary 
to further the protective purpose of the California statutes. 
152 [d. at 767 -S. 
163 [d. at 74S. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
California has been the pioneer in eradicating and amend-
ing the archaic laws of real estate disclosure that have no place 
in today's society.15' California's method of picking away at the 
caveat emptor rule is an example of this. The ruling of this 
case moves backward with respect to broker disclosure. Con-
sidering the influence California has on other states, this rul-
ing will have a detrimental effect on the way courts will rule 
across the country. As a result, children like Marcos will be 
left with no recourse for their injuries. 
In Coldwell Banker, instead of making an equitable deci-
sion, the court followed the strict wording of a statute and a 
creative interpretation of case law to come to its ruling. Rather 
than following what was right, the court turned its back on 
Marcos in order to create a bright-line rule. Taking this lim-
ited approach was not the only option in this case. The court 
has the power to make equitable decisions, and expand the 
duty to minor children, but it chose not to in this case. 
Instead of looking solely at the statute, the court should 
have used the common-law balancing test to establish duty. By 
following the statute, the court ruled that no duty was owed to 
Marcos, and it threw the case out on summary judgment.155 
The court prevented a jury from ever being able to examine 
whether the broker owed a duty to a minor child. Letting the 
case go to a jury would at least have allowed the child his day 
in court. It would not necessarily expose brokers to unwar-
ranted liability because all the other elements of negligence 
still need to be established, particularly the causal link be-
tween the broker's failure to disclose and the harm suffered. 
The balancing test is an equitable approach that considers 
many factors before duty is established. It has been used in 
many contexts and withstood the test of time. Instead of apply-
ing the balancing test in Coldwell Banker, the court chose a 
restrictive interpretation of the statute. This restriction al-
lowed the court to ignore the fact that the health of a minor 
child had been seriously jeopardized by the negligence of a bro-
1M See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963), Easton v. Strassburger, 199 
Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15, 2079-2079.10 (West 
2005). 
'56 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 573. 
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ker. It made an unfair application of the statute which re-
sulted in an injured boy without a cause of action. Since the 
courts are not clear on the intention of the statute, it may be 
time for the Legislature to take this issue under review in or-
der to clarify the statutory meaning of section 2079. Failure to 
do so will result in many more children like Marcos being in-
jured without redress and brokers laughing all the way to the 
bank. 
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